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Abstract
Constructible $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}\sim A,$ also called strong negation, is an alternative to Heyt-
ing’s negation $\neg A(rightarrow(Aarrow[perp]))$ in intuitionistic logics. In this paper we give the
proofs for Kripke completeness of the basic logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and its five variations. Among
them the most ffesh results are about the logics with what we call omniscience
axiom, $\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A).$ We present two different proofs based on tree-sequents: one
is by an embedding of classical logic, and the other is by an extended version of
tree-sequent.
1 Introduction
Intuitionistic logic $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ introduced by Heyting is a realization as aformal system of
Brauwer’s intuitionism as to mathematics. However, its negation $\neg A,$ which is equiv-
alent to $Aarrow[perp] \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ called Heyting’s negation to make distinct $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\sim A,$ is subject
to criticisms that it is not constructive enough. For instance, it seems a natural de-
mand from constructivists’ point of view that in order to show $\neg\forall xA$ , we must know
aconcrete object $t$ such that $\neg A[t/x]$ holds. But this is not the case with Heyting’s
negation.
$\sim A$ , called construclible falsity or strong negation, was introduced independently
by Nelson [Ne149] and Markov [Mar50]. $\sim A$ is axiomatized in the Hilbert-style system
as follows:
$Aarrow(\sim Aarrow B)$
$\sim(A\Lambda B)rightarrow\sim A\vee\sim B$ $\sim(A\vee B)rightarrow\sim A\wedge\sim B$
$\sim(Aarrow B)rightarrow A\Lambda\sim B$ $\sim\sim Arightarrow A$ $\sim\neg Arightarrow A$
$\sim\forall xArightarrow\exists x\sim A$ $\sim\exists xArightarrow\forall x\sim A$
It is easy to verify that $\sim \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ free ffom such criticisms as stated above.
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The logic* $\mathrm{N}$ ( $\mathrm{N}$ stands for Nelson’s logic) is the $\neg$-free fragment of $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ plus con-
structible falsity $\sim \mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ as above. The basic logic considered in this paper is
the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $\mathrm{N}$ plus HeyCing’s negation $\neg$ .
We will also consider the variations of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ which are obtained by adding some of
the following characters:
$\mathrm{D}$ Constant domain Ctziom, $\forall x(A(x)\vee B)arrow\forall xA(x)\vee B$ . Here $x$ have no free
occurrences in $B$ . Its name comes from the fact that aKripke model for Int
which makes this axiom valid has aconstant domain, i.e. the same domain for
every possible world. This is one of the axioms which characterize intermediate
(or super-intuitionistic) logics.
$\mathrm{O}\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)$ , which the authors would like to call omniscience ctziom. This axiom
is needless to say peculiar to the logics with both $\sim \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ $\neg$ , and as we shall show
later, it is interpreted as a reference to Kripke model that every possible world
has an omniscient world which approves it. This axiom may also be considered
as one of the weaker versions of the law of excluded middle, $A\vee\sim A\dagger$ .
$\mathrm{P}$ This indicates omitting the axiom $Aarrow(\sim Aarrow B)$ , and as aresult we have
paraconsistency.
With these three characters we obtain $8(=2^{3})$ variations of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , which form the
lattice (the upperright the stronger) presented below (Fig. 1).
$\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
$-\mathrm{P}$
Fig. 1: $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -family
In the literature [AN84] $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{D},$ $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{P}$ or NDP ( $\neg$-free fragment of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$)
is referred to as $\mathrm{N}^{+},$ $\mathrm{N}^{-}$ or $\mathrm{N}^{+-}$ , respectively.
’In this paper the word logic is used for apair of aformal language and the set of formulas of that
language which are admitted as theorems. To define the set of theorems, we will adopt Gentzen-style
sequent systems.
$\uparrow\neg A\vee\neg\neg A$ is said to be the weak law of excluded middle and characterizes intermediate logics.
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In this paper we prove Kripke completeness of logics $\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$
and $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO.
For each logic we introduce a Gentzen-style sequent calculus, Kripke-type possible
world semantics, and give the correspondence between them, i.e. the completeness
theorem. For the proof of completeness, we adopt the general method tree-sequent.
Roughly stated, atree-sequent is $\mathrm{a}$ finite tree each of whose nodes are associated with a
sequent. Since it simulates the shape of Kripke models for variations oflnt, we can easily
obtain acounter-model for an unprovable sequent by expanding the corresponding tree-
sequent, hence the proof of completeness. In the literature [Kas99] applications for $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$,
some intermediate logics, modal logics, and relevant logics are presented.
For the logics $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ and $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO, we can hardly prove their Kripke completeness by
simply applying the tree-sequent method, because omniscience axiom may be regarded
as areference to “upper bounds” of Kripke models. Fkesh results in this paper lie in
the proofs for them; we present two different methods to consider the logics with O.
One uses an embedding of classical logic $\mathrm{C}1$ into $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O},$ and its idea is that an omniscient
possible world can be induced by a CI-model (which is usually called a $st_{7\mathrm{U}C}ture$ ) $.$ The
other proof is by an extended version of tree-sequent which the authors would like to
call tree-sequent with guardians.
Kripke completeness of the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{P}$ remain unconsidered in this
paper. It is hard to find an embedding of classical logic into those two logics, so that
our first method fails. And the method of tree-sequent with guardians also fails, while
tree-sequent can treat the logics $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ and $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P};$ in fact, the authors are not certain
as to which type of models $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{P}$ is complete. In any case, they require
more inspection .
We describe the notations used in this paper.
The relation $\equiv \mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ syntactical equivalence. For example, $A$ $\Lambda B$ and $B\Lambda$ $A$ are
logically equivalent in those logics considered in this paper. However, A $\Lambda B\not\equiv B\Lambda A$ .
$A[y/x]$ is asubstitution, i.e. a formula obtained by substituting every free occur-
rence of $x$ in $A$ by $y.$ It is not preferable that by substituting $x$ by $y$ a new bound
variable comes to existence, which is the case when a free occurrence of $x$ is in ascope
of $\forall y$ . We avoid such cases by taking variants, i.e. substituting bound variables.
As we do in the Tarski-type semantics for CI, in defining semantics we will introduce
constants each of which designates a certain individual $u.$ This kind of constant is said
to be the name of $u,$ and denoted by $\underline{u}$ .
We will sometimes denote a formula by $A(x)$ to emphasize that $x$ has free occur-
rences only in $A,$ as we just did to demonstrate constant domain axiom. However,
more often we do not add (x) but do put explicitly as “$x$ has no free occurrence in
. . .”.
For afinite set of formulas $\Gamma=\{A_{1}, \ldots, A_{m}\},$ the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\wedge\Gamma$ (or $\Gamma$ ) is defined as
$A_{1}\Lambda\ldots\Lambda A_{m}$ (or $A_{1}\vee\ldots\vee A_{m}$ ). If $\Gamma=\emptyset$ , then it is $\mathrm{T}$ (or 1), which is an abbreviation
of $Aarrow A$ (or $\neg(Aarrow A)$ , respectively).
ISome other cut-free sequent systems are presented by Ishimoto [Ish70], and Kripke completeness
of $\Sigma$ ( $\mathrm{N}$ plus constants) is presented by Tanaka [Tan80] whose proof is done differently from ours.
\S When we consider alogic with both $\neg$ and $\sim \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}$ it, it seems reasonable to admit $\sim\neg Arightarrow A$ as an
axiom. However, this results in the fact that the formula $\neg Aarrow(\sim\neg Aarrow B)$ is provable even without




2.1 Sequent System $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
Here we introduce the Gentzen-style sequent system for the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
The language of the logic $\mathrm{N}$ -consists of the following symbols:
$\bullet$ countably many variables, $x_{1},$ $x_{2},$ $\ldots$ ;
$\bullet$ countably many m-ary predicate symbols for each $m\in \mathrm{N},$ $p_{m}^{1},$ $p_{m}^{2},$ $\ldots$ ;
$\bullet$ logical connectives, $\Lambda,$ $\neg,$ $arrow,$ $\sim,$ $\forall$ .
$\vee \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ $\exists$ are introduced as defined symbols:
$A\vee B\equiv\sim(\sim A\Lambda\sim B)$ $\exists xA\equiv\sim\forall x\sim A$
$Arightarrow B$ is an abbreviation of $(Aarrow B)\Lambda(Barrow A)$ .
We do not consider constants or function symbols, which makes the arguments
simpler without essential loss of generality.
Terms and formulas of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ are composed in the same way as those of Cl, and note
that $\sim \mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ unary.
Asequent is defined as an ordered pair of finite sets of formulas, therefore the rule
of exchange or contraction is omitted.
Now we present the axioms and the inference rules of the Gentzen-style sequent
system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ for the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ :
$\overline{A\Rightarrow A}$
(axiom 1) $\overline{A,\sim A\Rightarrow}(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m} 2)$
$\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\Sigma,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\Pi}$ (weakening)
$\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,AA,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi}{\Gamma,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Delta,\Pi}$ (cut)
$\frac{A,B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{A\Lambda B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ $\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,B}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A\Lambda B}(\Lambda \mathrm{R})$
$\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,AB,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi}{Aarrow B,\Gamma,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Delta,\square }(arrow \mathrm{L})$




$\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow A[z/x]}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\forall xA}(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{S},\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$
$\frac{\sim A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta\sim B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\sim(A\Lambda B),\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ $\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim A,\sim B}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim(A\Lambda B)}(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{R})$
$\frac{A,\sim B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\sim(Aarrow B),\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\simarrow \mathrm{L})$ $\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim B}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim(Aarrow B)}(\simarrow \mathrm{R})$
$\frac{A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\sim\neg A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\sim\neg \mathrm{L})$ $\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim\neg A}(\sim\neg \mathrm{R})$
$\frac{A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\sim\sim A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\sim\sim \mathrm{L})$ $\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim\sim A}(\sim\sim \mathrm{R})$
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$\frac{\sim A[z/x],\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\sim\forall xA,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\sim\forall \mathrm{L})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$ $\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim A[y/x]}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim\forall xA}(\sim\forall \mathrm{R})$
Here the subscript $\mathrm{S}$ indicates the condition that the succedent of the conclusion consist
of only one formula, and $\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}$ the eigenvariable condition, i.e. the eigenvariable $z$ must
not appear in the conclusion.
Aformula $A$ is provable in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash A,$ if $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash\Rightarrow A$ .
Now we consider logical equivalence in $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ which require some remarks.
DEFINITION 2.1 (LOGICAL EQUIVALENCE IN $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ )
Let $A$ and $B$ be formulas of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ . $A$ and $B$ are logically equivalent, $A\cong_{\mathrm{N}_{\neg}}B$ , if
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash Arightarrow B$ and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash\sim Arightarrow\sim B$ .
THEOREM 2.2 (THE EQUIVALENCE THEOREM)
Let $C[]$ be a formula of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ where the special atomic fomula $[]$ is alloeved to appear,
and $C[A]$ a formula obtained by substituting every occurence of $[]$ by the formula A. If
$A\cong \mathrm{N}_{\neg}B$ , Then $C[A]\cong_{\mathrm{N}_{\neg}}C[B]$ .
Proof. By the induction on the construction of $C[]$ . 1
REMARK 2.3
It is common in alogic $\mathrm{L}$ which does not $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\sim \mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}$ define the logical equivalence
$A\cong\llcorner B$ by $\mathrm{L}\vdash Arightarrow B.$ However, this is not enough to allow the equivalence theorem
for the logics with $\sim \mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}$ we shall see in lemma 2.8.
It is required naturally that the meaning of a formula $A$ is invariant as to substitu-
tion of bound variables.
LEMMA 2.4
If $z$ has no free occurrences in $A,$ then $\forall zA[z/x]\cong_{\mathrm{N}_{\neg}}\forall xA,$ $i.e$ . variants are logically
equivalent in $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
2.2 Kripke-Type Semantics for $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
The Kripke-type possible world semantics for $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is introduced as anatural extension
of that for Int, which is one of the reasons why logics with constructible falsity are
worthy of consideration.
Let $(M, \leq)$ be aposet, $W$ a non-empty set, $U$ be a map of $M$ into $\mathfrak{P}W$ , satisfying
$\bullet$ $U(a)\neq\emptyset$ for all $a\in M$ ;
$\bullet$ $a\leq b$ implies $U(a)\subseteq U(b)$ .
For every predicate symbol $p$ (we assume $p$ is m-ary), we define two interpretations of
$p$ in $a\in M,$ $p^{I^{+}(a)}$ and $p^{I^{-}(a)}$ , as subsets of $U(a)^{m}$ , satisfying
$\bullet$ $a\leq b$ implies $p^{I^{+}(a)}\subseteq p^{I^{+}(b)}$ and $p^{I^{-}(a)}\subseteq p^{I^{-}(b)}$ ;
$\bullet p^{I^{+}(a)}\cap p^{I^{-}(a)}=\emptyset$ .
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Then the quintuple $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ is said to be an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model.
An element $a$ in $M$ is said to be apossible world, and can be thought of as astage
of our knowledge. $a\leq b$ can be read as $b$ is more advanced, knows more than $a$ . $U(a)$
is called adomain of $a$ , being the set of individuals recognized by $a$ .
Given an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}-\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1\mathfrak{M}$, we can obtain the two relations between $a\in M$ and a
closed formula $A,$ $a\models^{+}$ $A$ and $a\models^{-}A$ , by extending two interpretations $I^{+}$ and $I^{-}$
in the procedure shown below. $a\models^{+}$ $A$ or $a\models^{-}$ $A$ may be interpreted as “a verifies
$A$” or “a refutes $A$”respectively (this terminology the authors hope reflects the idea
of constructivism).
$a\models^{+}$ $A$ and $a\models^{-}$ $A$ are defined inductively on the construction of the closed
formula $A$ :
$a\models^{+}p(\underline{u_{1}}, \ldots,\underline{u_{m}})$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $(u_{1}, \ldots, u_{m})\in p^{I^{+}(a)}$ ;
$a\models^{-}p(\underline{u_{1}}, \ldots,\underline{u_{m}})$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $(u_{1}, \ldots, u_{m})\in p^{I^{-}(a)}$ ;
$a\models^{+}A$ $\Lambda B$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $a\models^{+}A$ and $a\models^{+}B$ ;
$a\models^{-A\Lambda B}$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $a\models^{-A}$ or $a\models^{-}B$ ;
$a\models^{+}Aarrow B$ $\Leftrightarrow$ for every $b\geq a$ , $b\models^{+}A$ implies $b\models^{+}B$ ;
$a\models^{-A}arrow B$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $a\models^{+}A$ and $a\models^{-B}$ ;
$a\models^{+}\neg A$ $\Leftrightarrow$ for every $b\geq a$ , $b\#^{+}A$ ;
$a\models^{-}\neg A$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $a\models^{+}A$ ;
$a\models^{+}\sim A$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $a\models^{-}A$ ;
$a\models^{-}\sim A$ $\Leftrightarrow$ $a\models^{+}A$ ;
$a\models^{+}\forall xA$ $\Leftrightarrow$ for every $b\geq a$ and every $u\in U(b)$ , $b\models^{+}A[\underline{u}/x]$ ;
$a\models^{-}\forall xA$ $\Leftrightarrow$ for some $u\in U(a)$ , $a\models^{-}A[\underline{u}/x]$ .
The case where neither $a\models^{+}$ $A$ nor $a\models^{-}$ $A$ holds is interpreted as “a cannot tell
the tmth of $A$”and denoted by $a\#^{+-}A$ .
Aformula $A$ of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is valid in an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ , $\mathfrak{M}\models A$ , if
$a\models^{+}\forall\vec{x}A$ for every $a\in M$ , where $\forall\vec{x}A$ is auniversal closure of A. $A$ is valid,
$\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\models A$ , if $A$ is valid in every $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-model.
A sequent $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is valid (or valid in $\mathfrak{M}$), $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\models\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ (or $\mathfrak{M}\models\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$),
if the formula $(\wedge\Gamma)arrow(\Delta)$ is valid (or valid in $\mathfrak{M}$).
The result of the following lemma is necessary for $a\in M$ to be considered as astage
of knowledge, and is verified easily by the induction on the construction of aformula
$A$ .
LEMMA 2.5
Let $A$ a formula of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ be an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model, $a,$ $b\in M$ and $a\leq b$ .
Then $a\models^{+}A$ (or $a\models^{-A}$ ) implies $b\models^{+}A$ (or $b\models^{-A}$ , respectively).
The next lemma is proved by the induction on the construction of aformula $A$ , the
base case of which is verified by the condition of an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-model $p^{I^{+}(a)}\cap p^{I^{-}(a)}=\emptyset.$ This
is not the case for the logics with the letter $\mathrm{P}$ , i.e. those which allow paraconsistency.
LEMMA 2.6
Let $A$ a formula of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ be an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model and $a\in M.$ Then it is
impossible that both $a\models^{+}A$ and $a\models^{-A}$ hold.
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The soundness of the sequent system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ with respect to the Kripke-type semantics
defined above is also easily proved by the induction on the derivation in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
THEOREM 2.7 (KRIPKE s0UNDNESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ )
If $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ , then $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\models\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ .
From the soundness theorem we can obtain the following result which justifies the
definition of logical equivalence in $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ (see remark 2.3).
COROLLARY 2.8
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash Arightarrow B$ does not necessarily imply $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash\sim Arightarrow\sim B$ .
Proof. Let $p$ and $q$ be distinct 0-ary predicate symbols, then it is easy to verify
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash(p\Lambda\sim p)rightarrow(q\Lambda\sim q)$.
Here let $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ be an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-model where $M=\{0\},$ $0\models^{+}p,$ $0\#^{+-}q$ .
Then $\mathfrak{M}\#\sim(p\Lambda\sim p)rightarrow\sim(q\Lambda\sim q),$ hence $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\forall\sim(p\Lambda\sim p)rightarrow\sim(q\Lambda\sim q)$ by
$\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}|$
contraposition of the theorem.
Now we can give some examples of $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}/\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ formulas in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}.$ We
present them in comparison with $\mathrm{C}1$ or $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}.$ In the table presented below, $\neg$ is denoted
by $\sim \mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ Cl or Int.
2.3 Tree-Sequent System $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
Here we introduce $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , the tree-sequent system for $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , and consider the relation
between $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and the Gentzen-style system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
In the next subsection, we shall prove Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ using tree-
sequents. In general, aformal deductive system (ofHilbert-style, Gentzen-style, tableau
method, or else) is designed to derive a formula which is valid in any model of the cor-
responding semantics. This request can be stated differently, as “a formal deductive
system should derive aformula for which we have no counter models”. This may help
us understand how the idea of tree-sequents is obtained or justified.
In variations of $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t},$ we can assume a Kripke model to form atree by taking every
path in an original model as anew node. Thus if we would like aunit of deduction to
simulate the shape of Kripke models, its shape should be atree.
Atree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is $\mathrm{a}$ finite tree each of whose nodes is associated with its
own $\Gamma \mathrm{g}\Delta$ , where $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ is asequent of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $\alpha \mathrm{a}$ finite set of variables, and the
following conditions are satisfied:
$\bullet$ Let $a$ be an arbitrary node of $\mathcal{T},$ $a\mathrm{o}(=0),$ $a_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $a_{n}(=a)$ apath from the root
0of $\mathcal{T}$ to $a$ , and $\Gamma_{i}\Rightarrow\alpha_{i}\Delta_{i}$ associated to $a_{i}.$ Then $\alpha 0,$ $\alpha_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $\alpha_{n}$ are disjoint.
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The (disjoint) union $\alpha_{0}\cup\alpha_{1}\cup\cdots\cup\alpha_{n}$ is said to be the set of available variables
at the node a.
$\bullet$ Every free variable which appears in the sequent associated to $a$ is available at $a$ .
If $\Gamma\Rightarrow\alpha\Delta$ is associated to anode $a$ (we will denote this by $a$ : $\Gamma\Rightarrow\alpha\Delta$ ), then $\alpha$ is
the set of variables which are available at $a$ for the first time in tracing from the root.
We present an example of atree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ :
$\neg(p(x)\vee\sim p(x))$
This tree-sequent can also be denoted in the following styles:
$\{z\}\Rightarrow r(z, y)$
$\underline{\neg(p(x)\vee\sim p(x))4p(x)\vee\sim p(x)\forall z(q(y)\vee r(z,y))\Rightarrow q(y)\vee\forall zr(z,y)\{y\}}$
$\{x\}\Rightarrow\neg\neg(p(x)\vee\sim p(x))$
or
$[$ $\{x\}\Rightarrow\neg\neg(p(x)\vee\sim p(x))|[\neg(p(x)\vee\sim p(x))\Rightarrow^{\emptyset}p(x)\vee\sim p(x)]$
$[\forall z(q(y)\vee r\langle z, y))\{y\}\Rightarrow q(y)\vee\forall zr(z, y)|\{z\}\Rightarrow r(z, y)]$ $]$
We will adopt the last one for the economy of space, i.e.
$\mathcal{T}_{1}$ $\mathcal{T}_{m}$
is denoted by $[\Gamma 3\Delta|\mathcal{T}_{1}\ldots \mathcal{T}_{m}]$ .
$\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$
However, this style hardly clarify the structure of atree-sequent. It will help us un-
derstand better to rewrite in the first style.
The $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\triangleright \mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ system $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ derives tree-sequents using the following axioms and
inference rules:




For instance, (axiom 1) is interpreted that if asequent of the form $A\Rightarrow A$ is associated
to any node of $\mathcal{T}$ , then $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T}$.
$\ldots\cdots\frac{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|}{[\Sigma,\Gamma\xi\Delta,\Pi|}\ldots\ldots$ (weakening)
This is interpreted as we can add any formula to the antecedent or the succedent of a
sequent associated to any node.
$\underline{\ldots[\Gamma\xi\Delta,A|\cdots}$. . . [$A,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\cdots$ (cut)
. . . $[\Gamma,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ $\Pi|\cdots$
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Here the tree-structure and the nodes not displayed are the same among the conclusion
and the two hypotheses .
$\underline{\ldots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\alpha\ldots[A,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\cdots]\cdots]\beta\ldots}$
(drop L)
. . . $[A, \Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\cdots[\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots]\cdots]\cdots$
Here aformula $A$ in the antecedent of a node $b:A,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Delta$ is dropped to the antecedent
$\beta$
of asequent associated to the mother of $b$ .
$\underline{\ldots[A,B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\cdots}(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$
. . . [A $\Lambda B$ , I $\epsilon\Delta|\cdots$
Here the rule $(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is applied to one node (more precisely, a sequent associated
to one node), and the tree-structure and the nodes not displayed are the same between
the hypothesis and the conclusion.
$\ldots\ldots\frac{[\Gamma\epsilon\Delta,A|\cdots\cdots[\Gamma\epsilon\Delta,B|}{[\Gamma 3\Delta,A\wedge B|}\ldots\cdots(\Lambda \mathrm{R})$
Here the tree-structure and the nodes not displayed are the same among the conclusion
and the two hypotheses. This kind of remark is to be attached to every inference rule
presented below.
$\underline{\ldots[\Gamma\xi\Delta,A|\cdots}$. . . $[B,$ $\Sigma@\Pi|\cdots(arrow \mathrm{L})$
. . . $[Aarrow B,$ $\Gamma,$ $\Sigma\xi\Delta,$ $\Pi|\cdots$
$\underline{\ldots[\Gamma\epsilon\Delta|\cdots[A\Rightarrow B]\cdots]\emptyset\cdots}(arrow \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$
... [I $\xi\Delta,$ $Aarrow B|\cdots$
Here the daughter $A\Rightarrow B\emptyset$ (which must be a leaf) of the node $\Gamma\in\Delta$ in the hypothesis
is trimmed. The subscript $\mathrm{t}$ will be added to the rules of this type, i.e. a leaf is trimmed.
$. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{[\Gamma 3\Delta,A|}{[\neg A,\Gamma 3\Delta|}..\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot(\neg \mathrm{L})$
$\ldots\ldots\frac{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\cdots[A4]\cdots]}{[\Gamma \mathrm{g}\Delta,\neg A|}\ldots\cdots(\neg \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$
$\underline{\ldots[A[y/x],\Gamma 3\Delta|\cdots}(\forall \mathrm{L})$
.. . [$\forall xA$ , I $\xi\Delta|\cdots$
$\underline{\ldots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\cdots[\Rightarrow A[z/x]]\cdots]\{z\}\ldots}(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$
. . . [I $\Rightarrow\Delta,\forall xA|\cdots$
$z$ is not available at the node associated with $\Gamma\xi\Delta,$ thus $z$ does not appear as afree
variable in $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ .
$\tau_{\mathrm{C}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}}$ rule is necessary for the proofs of lemma 2.9 and its counterparts for other logics, which are
used only when omniscience axiom is involved. Hence just to prove the completeness of the logics
without the letter $\mathrm{O}$ , we do not need cut rule.
Moreover, if the Gentzen-style system is proved to be cut-free, then cut rule of the tree-sequent
system can also be omitted.
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$\ldots\ldots\frac{[\sim A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\alpha[\sim B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\alpha}{[\sim(A\Lambda B),\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\alpha}\ldots\ldots\ldots\cdots(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ $. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{[\Gamma 3\Delta,\sim A,\sim B|}{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim(\alpha A\Lambda B)|}..\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{R})$
$\underline{\ldots[A,\sim B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\cdots}(\simarrow \mathrm{L})$
$\ldots\ldots\frac{[\Gamma 3\Delta,A|\cdots\cdots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim B|}{[\Gamma\epsilon\Delta,\sim(Aarrow B)|}\ldots\cdots(\simarrow \mathrm{R})$
. . . $[\sim(Aarrow B),$ $\Gamma 3\Delta|\cdots$
.
$. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{[A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|}{[\sim\neg A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|}...\cdot\cdot\cdot(\sim\neg \mathrm{L})$
.
$. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{[\Gamma\xi\Delta,A|}{[\Gamma\xi\Delta,\sim\neg A|}...\cdot\cdot\cdot(\sim\neg \mathrm{R})$
.
$. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{[A,\Gamma 3\Delta|}{[\sim\sim A,\Gamma\xi\Delta|}...\cdot\cdot\cdot(\sim\sim \mathrm{L})$
.
$. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{[\Gamma\xi\Delta,A|}{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim\sim A|}...\cdot\cdot\cdot(\sim\sim \mathrm{R})$
$\ldots\ldots\frac{[\sim A[z/x],\Gamma 4^{z\}}\alpha\cup\Delta|}{[\sim\forall xA,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|}\ldots\cdots(\sim\forall \mathrm{L})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$
.
$.. \cdot..\frac{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim A[y/x]|}{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\sim\forall xA|}$
.
$.\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot(\sim\forall \mathrm{R})$
$\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}$ , an abbreviation for the variable condition, is that the eigenvariable $z$ must not
appear in any node of the conclusion.
Now we will consider the relation between $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , through the following
two lemmas.
LEMMA 2.9
Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ . If $\mathcal{T}$ has a node $a$ :I4 $\Delta$ such that $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ ,
then $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T}$.
Proof. By the induction on the derivation of $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ . It is easy to check
the case where the rule or the axiom applied at last is other than $($ $)_{\mathrm{S}}$ i.e. those
which demand the succedent of the conclusion consist of only one formula. We will
only present the case for $(arrow \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{S}},$ $(\neg \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{S}}$ or $(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{S},\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$ .
For $(arrow \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{S}}$ , we have in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ . $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .
$.. \cdot.\cdot.\ldots\frac{\underline{[4|\cdots[\Gamma,A\Rightarrow B]\cdots]\emptyset}}{\frac{[\Gamma 3|\cdots[A\Rightarrow B]\cdots]0}{[\Gamma\Rightarrow Aarrow B|\alpha}}\ldots\cdot..\cdot.\cdot(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{L})(arrow \mathrm{R})$
For $(\neg \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{S}}$ ,
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ . $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .
$.. \cdot.\cdot.\ldots\frac{\underline{[3|\cdots[\Gamma,A\Rightarrow]\cdots]\emptyset}}{\frac{[\Gamma\Rightarrow|\cdots[\alpha A\Rightarrow]\cdots]\emptyset}{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\neg A|}}\ldots\cdot..\cdot.\cdot(\mathrm{d}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}(\neg \mathrm{R}) \mathrm{L})$
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For $(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{S},\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$ ,
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ . $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .




A pre-tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ satisfies all the conditions of a tree-sequent except the
one that if $x$ has $\mathrm{a}$ ffee occurrence in $a$ : $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ then $x$ is available at $a.$ This concept
is necessary for the proof of the next lemma which is done by an induction.
The translation into a fomula of a pre-tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ denoted by $\mathcal{T}^{f}$ , is
defined inductively on the height of $\mathcal{T}$ ;
$[\Gamma \mathrm{s}\Delta|\mathcal{T}_{1}\ldots \mathcal{T}_{m}]^{f}:\equiv\forall\not\supset((\wedge\Gamma)arrow(\vee\Delta)\vee \mathcal{T}_{1}^{f}\vee\cdots\vee \mathcal{T}_{m}^{f})$
Then the next important lemma is proved, which approves so called the soundness
of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
LEMMA 2.10
If $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T},$ ihen $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T}^{f}$ .
To prove this lemma we will prepare a couple of sublemmas.
SUBLEMMA 2.11
Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $a$ a node of $\mathcal{T},$ $\mathcal{T}’$ a pre-tree-sequent which consists
of all the descendants of $a,$ $\mathcal{T}_{1}’,$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}’$ pre-tree-sequents of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , and $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}$ be $a$
tree-sequent obtained by substituting $\mathcal{T}’$ by $\mathcal{T}_{1}’,$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}’,$ respectively (Fig. 2).
Fig. 2: $\mathcal{T},$ $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}$
Then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime f},$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}^{\prime f}\Rightarrow \mathcal{T}^{\prime f}$ implies $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T}_{1}^{f},$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}^{f}\Rightarrow \mathcal{T}^{f}$ .
$\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{U}\mathrm{B}\mathrm{L}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{A}}2.12$
Let $\mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{T}’$ the same as those in the sublemma above. Then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T}^{\prime f}$ implies
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash \mathcal{T}^{f}$ .
Proof. Both sublemmas are proved easily by the induction on the height of $a$ in $\mathcal{T}_{-}$.
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Proof of lemma 2.10
By the induction on the derivation of $\mathcal{T}$ in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ . For the base case, i.e. when $\mathcal{T}$ is an
axiom, use sublemma 2.12.teForthe step cases where $\mathcal{T}$ is derived by an inference rul$\mathrm{e}$lwith ahypothesis (or hypo heses), use sublemma 2.11.
2.4 Kripke Completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
Here we present the way how we can construct what we may call acounter $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model
for an unprovable tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , hence Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ . Then
Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is obtained immediately by lemma 2.10.
The sketch is as follows. Let $\mathcal{T}$ be an unR tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , then we can
extend $\mathcal{T}$ to obtain an infinite tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ which is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturated(we shall define
this concept later). A $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturated tree-sequent induces an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-model $\mathfrak{M}$ (here the
set of available variables at $a$ is used as the seed of the domain of $a$), and this is what
we would like to obtain, i.e. acounter-model for $\mathcal{T}$ .
We start with defining the concept $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturatedness, which is anatural extension
of that for $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$ . Here an infinite tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is apossibly infinite tree each of
whose node is associated with its own $\Gamma \mathrm{g}\Delta$ , where $\Gamma$ and $\Delta$ are sets of apossibly
infinite number of formulas of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , and $\alpha$ is aset of apossibly infinite number of vari-
ables, and satisfies the same conditions as those of atree-sequent, as to the availability
of variables.
DEFINITION 2.13 $(\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{S}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{S})$
An infinite tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -saturated if it satisfies the following condi-
tions:
1. Let $a$ : I4 $\Delta$ and $b$ : $\Sigma\Rightarrow\beta$ II be nodes of $\mathcal{T}$ . If $b$ is adescendant of $a$ , then
$\Gamma\subseteq\Sigma$ ;
2. For every node $a:\mathrm{I}\Rightarrow\Delta$ of $\mathcal{T}$,
(a) $(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$-saturated:If $A\wedge B\in\Gamma$ , then $A\in\Gamma$ and $B\in\Gamma$ ;
(b) $(\Lambda \mathrm{R})$-saturated:If A $\Lambda B\in\Delta$ , then $A\in\Delta$ or $B\in\Delta$ ;
(c) $(arrow \mathrm{L})$-saturated:If $Aarrow B\in\Gamma$ , then $A\in\Delta$ or $B\in\Gamma$ ;
(d) $(arrow \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$-saturated:If $Aarrow B\in\Delta$ , then there exists adescendant $b:\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta$
of $a$ such that $A\in\Sigma$ and $B\in\Pi$ ;
(e) $(\neg \mathrm{L})$-saturated:If $\neg A\in\Gamma$ , then $A\in\Delta$ ;
(f) $(\neg \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$-saturated:If $\neg A\in\Delta$ , then there exists adescendant $b$ : $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta$ of $a$
such that $A\in\Sigma$ ;
(g) $(\forall \mathrm{L})$-saturated If $\forall xA\in\Gamma$ , then $A[y/x]\in\Gamma$ for every available variable $y$
at $a$ ;
(h) $(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$-saturated:If $\forall xA\in\Delta$ , then there exists adescendant $b:\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta$ of
$a$ and avariable $y$ such that $A[y/x]\in\Pi$ ;
(i) $(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ -saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim(A\Lambda B)\in\Gamma,$ $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\sim A\in\Gamma$ or $\sim B\in\Gamma$ ;
(j) $(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{R})$ -saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim(A\Lambda B)\in\Delta,$ $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\sim A\in\Delta \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\sim B\in\Delta$ ;
(k) $(\simarrow \mathrm{L})$ -saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim(Aarrow B)\in\Gamma,$ then $A\in\Gamma \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\sim B\in\Gamma$ ;
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(1) $(\simarrow \mathrm{R})$-saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim(Aarrow B)\in\Delta,$ then $A\in\Delta \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim B\in\Delta$ ;
(m) $(\sim\neg \mathrm{L})$-saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim\neg A\in\Gamma,$ then $A\in\Gamma$ ;
(n) $(\sim\neg \mathrm{R})$-saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim\neg A\in\Delta,$ then $A\in\Delta$ ;
(o) $(\sim\sim \mathrm{L})$-saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim\sim A\in\Gamma,$ then $A\in\Gamma$ ;
(p) $(\sim\sim \mathrm{R})$-saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim\sim A\in\Delta$ , then $A\in\Delta$ ;
(q) $(\sim\forall \mathrm{L})$-saturated: $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim\forall xA\in\Gamma,$ $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\sim A[y/x]\in\Gamma$ for some variable $y$ ;
(r) $(\sim\forall \mathrm{R})- \mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ : $\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\sim\forall xA\in\Delta,$ $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\sim A[y/x]\in\Delta$ for every available
variable $y$ at $a$ .
Note that for the rules $($ $)_{\mathrm{t}}$ , descendants are involved.
Now let $\mathcal{T}$ a tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ such that there is at least one variable available
at its root, and $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\forall \mathcal{T}.$ We describe the way $\mathcal{T}$ is extended to a $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturated
infinite tree-sequent.
By our definition of the language of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ there are only countably many formulas
of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ hence we can enumerate them as $B_{1},$ $B_{2},$ $\ldots.$ We arrange this to obtain anew
sequence,
$B_{1}|B_{1},$ $B_{2}|B_{1},$ $B_{2},$ $B_{3}|\ldots$
which we denote by $A_{1},$ $A_{2},$ $\ldots.$ The point is that every formula of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ appears infinitely
many times in $A_{1},$ $A_{2},$ $\ldots.$ Again by definition, a term of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is to be avariable and
we can enumerate them as $x_{1},$ $x_{2},$ $\ldots$ .
We extend $\mathcal{T}_{0}(:\equiv \mathcal{T})$ step by step and obtain a sequence of (finite) tree-sequents
$\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\mathcal{T}_{2},$
$\ldots$ .The step from $\mathcal{T}_{i-1}$ to $\mathcal{T}_{i}$ is for the reduction of the formula $A_{i}$ , described
below in detail. It should be paid attention to that each operation preserves the
unprovability of the tree-sequent.
1. (inheritance) For every node $a:\Gamma\xi\Delta$ of $\mathcal{T}_{i-1}$ such that $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ , add $A_{i}$ to the
antecedent of each descendant of $a.$ This operation is called an inheritance, and
preserves unprovability because of the rule (drop $\mathrm{L}$);
2. (reduction) According to the shape of $A_{i},$ one of the following operations is
executed for each node $a$ :I3 $\Delta$ of $\mathcal{T}_{i-1}$ :
(a) $A_{i}\equiv B\Lambda$ C. If $A_{i}\in\Gamma,$ then add $B$ and $C$ to $\Gamma.$ This operation preserves
unprovability because of the rule $(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}.$ If $A_{i}\in\Delta,$ then at least one
of the tree-sequents obtained by adding $B$ or $C$ to $\Delta$ is unprovable because
of the rule $(\Lambda \mathrm{R}).$ Take the unprovable one as a resulting tree-sequent ;
(b) $A_{i}\equiv Barrow C.$ If $A_{i}\in\Gamma,$ then add $B$ to $\Delta,$ or $C$ to $\Gamma,$ so that the resulting
tree-sequent remains unprovable. If $A_{i}\in\Delta$ , then make anew daughter
(which is aleaf) of $a,$ $b:B\Rightarrow^{\emptyset}C$ ;
(c) $A_{i}\equiv\neg B.$ If $A_{i}\in\Gamma,$ then add $B$ to $\Delta.$ If $A_{i}\in\Delta,$ then make anew daughter
$b:B4$ of $a$ ;
(d) $A_{i}\equiv\forall xB.$ If $A_{i}\in\Gamma,$ then add $B[y/x]$ to $\Gamma,$ for every $y$ which is available
at $a$ and is in $\{x_{1}, \ldots, x_{i}\}.$ If $A_{i}\in\Delta,$ then take affesh variable $x_{m}$ and
make anew daughter $b$ : $\{x_{m}\}\Rightarrow B[x_{m}/x]$ of $a$ ;
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(e) $A_{i}\equiv\sim(B\Lambda C)$ . If $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ , add $\sim B\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim C$ to $\Gamma$ , so that the resulting
tree-sequent remains unprovable. If $A_{i}\in\Delta,$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\sim B\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\sim C$ to $\Delta$ ;
(f) $A_{i}\equiv\sim(Barrow C).$ If $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ , add $B\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\sim C$ to $\Gamma.$ If $A_{i}\in\Delta,$ add $B\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim C$
to $\Delta$ so that the resulting tree-sequent remains unprovable ;
(g) $A_{i}\equiv\sim\neg B$ or $A_{i}\equiv\sim\sim B$ . If $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ (or $\Delta$ ), add $B$ to $\Gamma$ (or $\Delta$ , respectively) ;
(h) $A_{i}\equiv\sim\forall xB$ . If $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ , then take afresh variable $x_{m},$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\sim B[x_{m}/x]$ to $\Gamma$ ,
and also add $x_{m}$ to $\alpha$ . If $A_{i}\in\Delta,$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\sim B[y/x]$ to $\Delta$ for every $y$ which is
available at $a$ and in $\{x_{1}, \ldots, x_{i}\}$ .
Take an infinite tree-sequent $\overline{\mathcal{T}}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}$-as aunion of $\mathcal{T}_{0},$ $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots,$ i.e. the tree-
structure of $\overline{\mathcal{T}}$ is aunion of those of $\mathcal{T}_{0},$ $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots$ , and the infinite sequent or the set of
variables associated to each node is again aunion of those of $\mathcal{T}_{0},$ $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots$ .
Then it is easily verified that $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturated.
Now we will construct an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ from $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ . Let $(M, \leq)$ be
atree-structure of $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ and $U(a)$ be the set of available variables at $a$ (here the condition
that one variable is available at the root of $\mathcal{T}$ assures that $U(a)\neq\emptyset$ for every $a\in M$).
For anode $a:\Gamma\xi\Delta$ of $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}$ and an m-ary predicate symbol $p$ ,
$p^{I^{+}(a)}:=\{(y_{1}, \ldots, y_{m})|p(y_{1}, \ldots, y_{m})\in\Gamma\}$
$p^{I^{-}(a)}:=\{(y_{1}, \ldots, y_{m})|\sim p(y_{1}, \ldots, y_{m})\in\Gamma\}$
The model $\mathfrak{M}$ defined above certainly satisfies the conditions of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -models;for
example, the condition $p^{I^{+}(a)}\cap p^{I^{-}(a)}=\emptyset$ is satisfied since every finite sub-tree-sequent
of $\mathcal{T}$ is unprovable in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ has an axiom
$-(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}2)$
. . . $[p(\vec{x}),$ $\sim p(\vec{x})\Rightarrow|\cdots$
Then the following fact is again easily verified by the induction on the construction
of aformula $A$ :for eevveerryy node $a$ : $\Gamma\xi\Delta$ of $\overline{\mathcal{T}},$ $A\in\Gamma$ implies $a\models^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ in $\mathfrak{M}$
and $A\in\Delta$ implies $a\#^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ . Here we used the fact that $\overline{\mathcal{T}}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturated.
With the fact that $\mathcal{T}$ is asub-tree-sequent of $\overline{\mathcal{T}}$ , we have proved the following
theorem:
THEOREM 2.14 (KRIpKE COMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ )
Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ at whose root at least one variable is available, and
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\forall \mathcal{T}$ . Then there exists a counter $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ for $\mathcal{T},$ that is:
$\bullet$ The tree-structure of $\mathcal{T}$ can be embedded in $(M, \leq)$ ;
$\bullet$ For each node $a:\Gamma\xi\Delta$ of $\mathcal{T},$ $A\in\Gamma$ implies $a\models^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ in $\mathfrak{M},$ and $A\in\Delta$
implies $a\#^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ .
From this we immediately obtain Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
COROLLARY 2.15 (KRIPKE COMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ )
For every formula $A$ of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\models A$ implies $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\vdash A$ .
Proof. Let $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\forall A$ , and $\alpha$ be anonempty finite set of variables which includes all
the ffee variables of $A$ . Then by $[\xi A]^{f}\cong_{\mathrm{N}_{\neg}}\forall\partial A$ and the contraposition of lemma
2.10, $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\forall$ $[3A]$ . The theorem shows that there exists an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-model $\mathfrak{M}$ such $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\underline{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}}$
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3 Logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$
In this section we consider the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ a variation of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ obtained by adding constant
domain axiom $\forall x(A(x)\vee B)arrow\forall xA(x)\vee B.$ This axiom corresponds to the reference
to Kripke models that every possible world has the same domain in common, as we
shall show later. Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ the Gentzen-style sequent system for
$\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ , is shown just as that for $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ using tree-sequents.
DEFINITION 3.1 (SEQUENT SYSTEM $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ )
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ is $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ plus the following axiom:
$\overline{\Rightarrow\forall x(A(x)\vee B)arrow\forall xA(x)\vee B}$
(axiom D)
The following is a well-known result in the intermediate logic $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D}$ and also easily
verified.
LEMMA 3.2
Let $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}’$ be the system obtained from $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ by substituting the $mle(\forall \mathrm{R})\mathrm{s}$ ,vc by
$\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A[z/x]}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\forall xA}(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$
$i.e$ . allow plrral fomulas in the succedent. Then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}’$ is equivalent to $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ .
DEFINITION 3.3 $(\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}- \mathrm{M}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{L})$
An $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ is an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$-model if $U$ is a constant map.
We define the validity, $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\models A,$ just like that of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}.$ Then the soundness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$
is shown by the induction on the derivation.
THEOREM 3.4 (KRIPKE SOUNDNESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ )
If $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ , then $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\models\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ .
Now we introduce $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ the tree-sequent system for $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}.$ A toee-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ is afinite tree each of whose nodes is associated with a sequent $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
(or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ . Each will do since they have the same language in common). This definition
is different from that of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ in that the indication of a set of variables is omitted here,
because in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ we need not consider whether a variable is available or not, which
worked as aseed of adomain in the proofs above.
The axioms and inference rules of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ are the same as those of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ except that
they have no consideration about availability of variables, and the rule $(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$ (which
trims aleaf) of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ is substituted by
$... \cdot..\frac{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A[z/x]|}{[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\forall xA|}..\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$
. The rule adopted here may be justified by lemma 3.2.
Next we consider the relation between $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ just as that between $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
LEMMA 3.5
Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a tree-sequent $of\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ D. If $\mathcal{T}$ has a node $a:\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ such that $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$,
then $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash \mathcal{T}$ .
Proof. Just like the case of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg},$ i.e. lemma 2.9. 1
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DEFINITION 3.6 (TRANSLATION)
Atranslation into a formula of a tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ denoted by $\mathcal{T}^{f},$ is a universal
closure of $\mathcal{T}^{p}$ , which in turn is defined inductively on the height of $\mathcal{T}$ ;
$[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta|\mathcal{T}_{1}\ldots \mathcal{T}_{m}]^{p}:\equiv(\wedge\Gamma)arrow(\vee\Delta)\vee \mathcal{T}_{1}^{p}\vee\cdots\vee \mathcal{T}_{m}^{p}$
Here the concept pre-tree-sequent is not necessary because it was for considering avail-
ability of variables.
LEMMA 3.7
If $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash \mathcal{T}$ , then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash \mathcal{T}^{f}$ .
Again we prepare acouple of sublemmas, the proofs for which are easy by induction
just like those for lemmas 2.11 and 2.12.
SUBLEMMA 3.8
Let $\mathcal{T},$ $\mathcal{T}’,$ $\mathcal{T}_{1}’,$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}’$ and $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}$ be just as those of lemma 2.11. Then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash$
$\mathcal{T}_{1}^{\prime p},$
$\ldots,$
$\mathcal{T}_{k}^{\prime p}\Rightarrow \mathcal{T}^{\prime p}$ implies $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash \mathcal{T}_{1}^{p},$ $\ldots,$ $\mathcal{T}_{k}^{p}\Rightarrow \mathcal{T}^{p}$ .
SUBLEMMA 3.9
Let $\mathcal{T}$ and $\mathcal{T}’$ the same as those in the sublemma above. Then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash \mathcal{T}^{\prime f}$ implies
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash \mathcal{T}^{f}$ .
Proof of lemma 3.7
By the induction on the derivation of $\mathcal{T}$ in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$D. The proof is carried out just like
that of lemma 2.10, and it suffices to check the case where $\mathcal{T}$ is inferred by the rule
$(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ D. In fact, we can not apply sublemma 3.8 which was used in the case
of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , therefore we will make use of the character of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ instead.
Suppose $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash(\cdots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta, A[z/x]|\cdots)^{f}$ as an induction hypothesis. Then
$(\cdots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta, A[z/x]|\cdots)^{f}$ is in the form
$\forall\vec{x}\forall z(B_{1}arrow C_{1}\vee(B_{2}arrow C_{2}\vee(\cdots\vee(B_{n}arrow C_{n}\vee A[z/x])\cdots)))$
, where $z$ has no free occurrence in any of $B_{i}$ or $C_{i}$ . Then we repeatedly apply the
following logical equivalences which are easily verified:
$\forall x(Barrow C(x))\cong \mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}Barrow\forall xC(x)$ $\forall x(C\vee D(x))\cong_{\mathrm{N}_{\neg}}{}_{\mathrm{D}}C\vee\forall xD(x)$
The second one is unique to logics with constant domain axiom. Thus we have the
logical equivalence,
$(\cdots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta, A[z/x]|\cdots)^{f}$
$\equiv\forall\vec{x}\forall z(B_{1}arrow C_{1}\vee(B_{2}arrow C_{2}\vee(\cdots\vee(B_{n}arrow C_{n}\vee A[z/x])\cdots)))$
$\cong_{\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}}\forall\vec{x}(B_{1}arrow C_{1}\vee(B_{2}arrow C_{2}\vee(\cdots\vee(B_{n}arrow C_{n}\vee\forall xA)\cdots)))$
$\equiv(\cdots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\forall xA|\cdots)^{f}$
By the induction hypothesis and the cut rule, we obtain
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash(\cdots[\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\forall xA|\mathrm{I}$
$\ldots)^{f}$ .
DEFINITION 3.10 ( $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$D-SATURATEDNESS)
An infinite tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ -saturated if $\mathcal{T}$ satisfies the conditions of
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturatedness(see definition 2.13) where the word available is omitted and the
condition $(2\mathrm{h})(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$-saturated is substituted by:
107
$(\forall \mathrm{R})$-saturated:If $\forall xA\in\Delta,$ then $A[y/x]\in\Delta$ for some variable $y$ ;
Now we can prove Kripke completeness extending an unprovable tree-sequent of
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ into saturation to obtain a counter model, as we did in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
Arrange all the formulas and variables to obtain sequences $A_{1},$ $A_{2},$ $\ldots$ and $x_{1},$ $x_{2},$ $\ldots$
as we did in the last section. Let $\mathcal{T}$ a tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ such that $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\forall \mathcal{T}$ .
We extend $\mathcal{T}$ step by step and obtain $\mathcal{T}_{0},$ $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots,$ where each step $\mathcal{T}_{i-1}$ to $\mathcal{T}_{i}$ is for the
reduction of $A_{i}.$ The operation carried out at each step is almost the same as that in
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ , being different in the following points:
$\bullet$ The word available is omitted;
$\bullet$ The case $(2\mathrm{d})$ is substituted by:
$(2\mathrm{d})A_{i}\equiv\forall xB$ . If $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ , then add all of $B[x_{1}/x],$ $\ldots,$ $B[x_{i}/x]$ to $\Gamma.$ If $A:\in$
$4$ then take a fresh variable $x_{m}$ and add $B[x_{m}/x]$ to $\Delta.$ This operation
preserves unprovability because of the rule $(\forall \mathrm{R})$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ ;
Let $\overline{\mathcal{T}}$ be aunion of $\mathcal{T}_{0},$ $\mathcal{T}_{1},$ $\ldots.$ Then $\overline{\mathcal{T}}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ -saturated.
From $\tilde{\mathcal{T}}$, we can construct an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ as follows: let
$(M, \leq)$ be atree-structure of $\tilde{\mathcal{T}},$ $U(a)$ the set of all the variables for every $a\in M$
(hence $\mathfrak{M}$ is $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$D-model, i.e. has the constant domain), and interpretations $I^{+}$ and $I^{-}$
just the same as those for $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
Then $\mathfrak{M}$ is acounter model for $\mathcal{T},$ and we obtain the following theorem:
THEOREM 3.11 (KRIPKE COMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ )
Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a tree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ such that $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\forall \mathcal{T}$ . Then there exists a counter
$\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$-model $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ for $\mathcal{T}$, that is:
$\bullet$ The tree-structure of $\mathcal{T}$ can be embedded in $(M, \leq)$ ;
$\bullet$ For each node $a:\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ of $\mathcal{T},$ $A\in\Gamma$ implies $a\models^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ in $\mathfrak{M},$ and $A\in\Delta$
implies $a\#^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ .
Kripke completeness of the Gentzen-style system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ is derived immediately as
acorollary:
COROLLARY 3.12 (KRIPKE COMPLETENESS 0F $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ )
For every formula $A$ of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\models A$ implies $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\vdash A$ .
Proof. Let $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\forall$ $A$ and $\mathcal{T}:\equiv[ \Rightarrow A].$ Since $\mathcal{T}^{f}\cong_{\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}}\forall\vec{x}A$ and the contraposi-
tion of lemma 3.7, $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\psi \mathcal{T}.$ The theorem shows that there exists an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$D-model
$\mathfrak{M}1$
such that $\mathfrak{M}\# A$ .
4Logics $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$
In this section we consider the logics $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ and $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P},$ obtained by omitting the axiom
$Aarrow(\sim Aarrow B)$ in $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ which results in paraconsistency.
Alogic $\mathrm{L}$ is explosive if in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{L},$ the Gentzen-style system for $\mathrm{L},$ $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{L}\vdash A,$ $\neg A\Rightarrow B$
(it depends on the language of $\mathrm{L}$ which one of $\neg \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim \mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}$ adopt, and in fact we use
$\sim \mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e})$ . For instance, $\mathrm{C}1,$ $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ and $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ are all explosive. $\mathrm{L}$ is paraconsistent if it is not
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Paraconsistent logics are certainly of considerable use as tools to formalize theories
which have some contradiction but are non-trivial. We can give some examples of such
theories; the Newton-Leibniz version of calculus, Cantor’s naive set theory, or early
quantum mechanics. The history and some approaches other than we present in this
paper are in the literature [PR84] by Priest and Routley, who adopt relevant logics as
an approach to paraconsistency. Whether $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$ is useful with respect to the
motivation stated above is to be inspected further.
The proof of Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$ is exactly the same as that
of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ , respectively.
The Gentzen-style sequent system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}$ -DP is defined by omitting the
axiom
$\overline{A,\sim A\Rightarrow}(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}2)$
in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ , respectively.
$\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ is an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$-model(or a $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$-model)if it satisfies all the
conditions of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model(or a $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$-model)except the one $p^{I^{+}(a)}\cap p^{I^{-}(a)}=\emptyset$ .
The tree-sequent system $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$ is obtained by omitting the axiom
$-(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}2)$
. .. $[A,$ $\sim A\doteqdot|\cdots$
in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ or $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ , respectively.
Then we can prove Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$ just like that of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ , respectively.
THEOREM 4.1 (KRIPKE SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ AND $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$ )
Let $\mathrm{L}$ be either $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$, and $A$ an arbitrary formula of L. Then $\mathrm{L}\models A$ if and
only if $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{L}\vdash A$ .
Rom the soundness, we can assure that $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$Pand $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$ are both paraconsistent:
COROLLARY 4.2
Let $\mathrm{L}$ be either $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{P}$ or $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{P}$ . Then sequents of the form $A,$ $\sim A\Rightarrow B$ are not provable
in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{L}$ , in general.
Proof. Let $p$ and $q0$-ary predicate symbols, $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ be an L-model
such that $M=\{0\},$ $0\models^{+}p,$ $0\models^{-}p$ , and 0 $\#^{+-}q$ . Then $\mathfrak{M}\# p\Lambda\sim parrow q$ and by the
soundness we have $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{L}\mu p,$ $\sim p\Rightarrow q$ . $\mathrm{I}$
5 Logics $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}$
5.1 First Proof-Kripke Completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$
In this subsection we consider the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ ( $\mathrm{O}$ for omniscience crxiom, $\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)$),
whose Kripke completeness we can hardly prove by only aPPlying the tree-sequent
method we used above. Here we use some fresh result about the relation to classical
logic.
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ , the Gentzen-style sequent system for $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ , is $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ plus the axiom
$\overline{\Rightarrow\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)}$
(axiom O)
An $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ is an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ -rnodel if for every $a\in M$ , there
exists $a’(\geq a)$ such that:
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$\bullet$ $a’$ is maximal in the poset $(M, \leq)$ ;
$\bullet$
$p^{I^{+}(a’)}\cup p^{I^{-}(a’)}=U(a’)^{m}$ for every predicate symbol $p,$ where $m$ is the arity of
$p$ .
From the condition $p^{I^{+}(a’)}\cap p^{I^{-}(a’)}=\emptyset$ of an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1,$ the union $p^{I^{+}(a’)}\cup p^{I^{-}(a’)}$ is
disjoint.
LEMMA 5. 1
Let $\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ be an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model, $a’\in M$ satisfy the two conditions itemized
above, and $A$ be an arbitrary closed fomula of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}.$ Then $a’\models^{+}$ $A$ or $a’\models^{-}A,$ and
by lemma 2.6 exactly one of them holds.
Proof. The proof is easy by the induction on the construction of $A,$ a formula of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$
where $\underline{u}$ , aname of an individual, is allowed to occur. We present here only the step
cases where $A\equiv Barrow C$ or $A\equiv\forall xA$ .
When $A\equiv Barrow C$ , assume $a’\#^{+}$ A. We shall show that $a’\models^{-}$ $A$ holds. If
$a’\models^{-}B$ , by lemma 2.5 for every $c\geq a’c\models^{-}B,$ which in turn implies $c\#^{+}B$ by
lemma 2.6. Hence $a’\models^{+}Barrow C,$ which is a contradiction. So we must have $a’\#^{-}B$ ,
which is equivalent to $a’\models^{+}B$ by the induction hypothesis. Now $a’\models^{+}C$ leads to $\mathrm{a}$
contradiction in the same way, so we must have $a’\models^{-}C$ by the induction hypothesis.
When $A\equiv\forall xB$ , assume $a’\#^{+}A.$ Since $a’$ is maximal, there exists $u\in U(a’)$ such
that $a’\#^{+}B[\underline{u}/x],$ which implies $a’\models^{-}B[\underline{u}/x]$ by the induction hypothesis. Hence
we have $a’\models^{-}\forall xB$ . I
$a’$ may be regarded as apossible world which is omniscient, in the sence of lemma 5.1.
This is the origin of the name of the axiom.
In order to prove Kripke soundness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O},$ we have only to $\mathrm{V}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathfrak{h}r$ that the formula
$\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)$ is valid in every $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1,$ which is obvious by lemma 5.1.
THEOREM 5.2 (KRIPKE SOUNDNESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ )
If $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ then $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\models\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ .




. Then the same relations as those between $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ hold between $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ and
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ , as we shall see in the following lemmas.
LEMMA 5.3
Let $\mathcal{T}$ be a tree-sequent $of\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}.$ If $\mathcal{T}$ has a node $a:\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ such that $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ ,
then $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash \mathcal{T}$ .
Proof. By the induction on the derivation of $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ . 1
We define the translation into a formula of a tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O},$ $\mathcal{T}^{f}$ , as the
same one as that of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
LEMMA 5.4
If $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash \mathcal{T},$ then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash \mathcal{T}^{f}$ .
Proof. Similarly to the proof of lemma 2.10. 1
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We make aremark about the language of Cl. All of $\vee,$ $arrow \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ $\exists$ can be introduced
as defined symbols in $\mathrm{C}1$ ;however in this paper we assume the logical connectives of Cl
be not only $\Lambda,$ $\neg$ and $\forall$ but include $arrow \mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}$ make correspondence with $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ .
In this paper astructure in Tarski-type semantics for Cl is often said to be aCl-
model. For aCl-model $\mathfrak{U}$ we denote the domain of $\mathfrak{U}$ by $|\mathfrak{U}|,$ and the interpretation
of apredicate symbol $p$ by $p_{\mathfrak{U}}$ . We will often denote a formula of $\mathrm{C}1$ by $A_{\neg},$ in order
to make clear that $A$ contains no $\sim’ \mathrm{s}$ . $A_{\sim}$-isaformula of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ which is obtained by
replacing some (possibly all or no) $\neg’ \mathrm{s}$ in $A$ by $\sim$ .
Now we prepare alemma which is abasic idea for the proof of Kripke completeness
of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ ; that is, a $\mathrm{C}1$ -model induces an omniscient possible utorld.
LEMMA 5.5
Let $\mathfrak{U}$ be a $\mathrm{C}1$ -model, and $\mathfrak{M}_{\mathfrak{U}}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$-model such that $M=\{0\}$ ,
$U(0)=|\mathfrak{U}|,$ $p^{I^{+}(0)}=p_{\mathfrak{U}}$ and $p^{I^{-}(0)}=U(0)^{m}\backslash p_{\mathfrak{U}}$ . Then for an arbitrary closed formula
$A_{\neg}$ of Cl, $21\models A_{\neg}$ iff $0\models^{+}A_{\sim}$-(or equivalently $\mathfrak{M}\models A_{\sim_{\neg}}$ ) $.$ From this and lemma
5.1, ate also have $\mathfrak{U}\# A_{\neg}$ iff $0\models^{-A}\sim\neg$ .
Proof. By the induction on the construction of $A_{\neg}.$ We only present the step case
where $A_{\neg}\equiv\neg B_{\neg}$ .
When $A_{\neg}\equiv\neg B_{\neg},$ $A_{\sim_{\neg}}$ is syntactically equivalent to $\neg B_{\sim_{\neg}}$ or $\sim B\sim\neg$ . $\mathfrak{U}\models A_{\neg}$
iff 21 $\# B_{\neg}$ , which is equivalent to 0 $\#^{+}B_{\sim}\neg$ by the induction hypothesis. This
is equivalent to $0\models^{+}\neg B_{\sim}\neg$ since 0has no descendants, and is also equivalent to
$0\models^{+}\sim B\sim\neg$ by lemma 5.1. $\mathrm{I}$
THEOREM 5.6 (MAIN THEOREM 1. KRIPKE COMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ )
If $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\models A,$ then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash A$.
Proof. We describe the sketch of the proof here, and the details shall be shown later
as lemmas.
Let $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\forall A$, and $\alpha$ be afinite set of variables which is nonempty and includes
every ffee variable of $A$ . By lemma 5.4 and $[4 A]^{f}\equiv\forall\partial A,$ $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\psi[4A].$ Now we
extend $[\xi A]$ into $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturation in the same way as we do in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ . Because $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ have the same inference rules in common, the procedure of extension preserves
the $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\underline{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}$ of the tree-sequent in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ . Hence as aresult we obtain an infinite
tree-sequent $\mathcal{T}$ which is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -saturated, and every finite sub-tree-sequent of which is
unprovable in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ . A $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturated $\mathcal{T}$ induces an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$
which makes $A$ not valid.
We are to add an omniscient world $a’$ to each possible world $a$ of $\mathfrak{M}$ , in the following
way.
Let $a$ : I $\mathrm{g}\Delta$ the node of $\overline{\mathcal{T}}$ which induces an $\mathrm{p}\underline{\mathrm{o}}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ world $a$ of $\mathfrak{M}$ . Then
by lemma 5.3 and that every finite sub-tree-sequent of $\mathcal{T}$ is unprovable in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O},$ for
every finite subsets $\Gamma’\subseteq\Gamma$ and $\Delta’\subseteq\Delta$ we have $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\forall\Gamma’\Rightarrow\Delta’,$ i.e. the infinite
sequent $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ is $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$-consistent. It is the result of corollary 5.10 that
ffom $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ we have a $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$-consistent sequent $\Gamma_{\neg}\Rightarrow$ , i.e. every finite subsequent of
which is unprovable in $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$ . Then by lemma 5.11 we can construct aCl-model 21 which
has alarge domain enough to include $U(a)$ and makes every formula in $\Gamma_{\neg}$ valid. We
construct $a’$ from $\mathfrak{U}$ as 0of $\mathfrak{M}_{\mathfrak{U}}$ in lemma 5.5. Then $a’$ is an omniscient possible world,
and we add it to $\mathfrak{M}$ as anew daughter of $a$ .
By carrying out this procedure for every node of $\mathfrak{M},$ we obtain an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1\mathfrak{M}’$
such that $\mathfrak{M}’\# A$ , hence Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}.$ It shall be shown in lemma
5.13 that $\mathfrak{M}’$ is acounter model for $A$ in fact. 1
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First we present some derivations which are only allowed in the logics with omni-
science axiom, and some related results.
LEMMA 5.7
In the system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ , the following $de7\dot{\mathrm{v}}vations$ are allouted:
$\overline{\neg\sim A,\neg A\Rightarrow}(l1)$
$\frac{\sim A,\Gamma\Rightarrow}{\neg A,\Gamma\Rightarrow}(\phi 2)$
$\overline{Aarrow B\Rightarrow\neg\neg(\sim A\vee B)}(\mathrm{J}3)$
Proof. The derivations above can be simulated in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ as follows. Here it is notable
that we do not use (axiom 2) $A,$ $\sim A\Rightarrow,$ hence these are also allowed in the systems
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{P}$ and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{P}$ (needless to say in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO).
$(l1)$
$\Rightarrow\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{O}$
$\frac{\frac(\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g},\neg \mathrm{L})\frac{\sim A\Rightarrow\sim A}{\overline{\sim A,\neg\sim A,\neg A\Rightarrow}}A,\neg\sim A,\neg A\Rightarrow\underline{A\Rightarrow A}}{\frac{\underline{A\vee\sim A,\neg\sim A,\neg A\Rightarrow}}{\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A),\neg\sim A,\neg A\Rightarrow}(\neg \mathrm{R},\mathrm{L})}(\vee \mathrm{L})$
$\overline{\neg\sim A,\neg A\Rightarrow}$ (cut)
$(l2)$
$\frac{\frac{\overline{\neg A,\neg\sim A\Rightarrow}}{\neg A\Rightarrow\neg\neg\sim A}(\neg \mathrm{R})(l1)\overline{\overline{\neg\neg\sim A,\Gamma\Rightarrow}}\overline{\sim A,\Gamma\Rightarrow}}{\neg A,\Gamma\Rightarrow}(\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}.\mathrm{t})\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}(\neg \mathrm{R}, \mathrm{L})$
$(\phi 3)$
$\frac{\Rightarrow\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{O}\frac{\frac{\frac{\underline{A\Rightarrow AB\Rightarrow B}}{Aarrow B,A\Rightarrow\sim A\vee B}(}{}(\neg \mathrm{L})Aarrow B,A,\neg(\sim A\vee B)\Rightarrow}{Aarrow B,\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)Aarrow B,A\vee\sim A,\neg}arrow \mathrm{L})\Rightarrow}{Aarrow B\Rightarrow\neg\neg(\sim A\vee B)}\frac{\overline{\overline{Aarrow B,\sim A\Rightarrow\sim A\vee B}}\sim A\sim A}{\Rightarrow\neg\neg(\sim A\vee B)\underline{\underline{(\sim A\vee B)\Rightarrow Aarrow B,\sim A,\neg(}}\sim A\vee B)\Rightarrow(\neg \mathrm{R},\mathrm{L},\mathrm{R}),(\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t})}(\neg \mathrm{L})(\vee \mathrm{L})$
I
LEMMA 5.8
Let the sequent system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}’$ be $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ plus an inference $mle$
$\frac{\sim A,\Gamma\Rightarrow}{\neg A,\Gamma\Rightarrow}(l2)$
. Then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}’\vdash\Rightarrow\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A),$ and with lemma 5.7 we obtain the equivalence of
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}’$ .
Proof.
$\frac{\overline{\sim A,\sim\sim A\Rightarrow}}{\sim(A\vee\sim A)\Rightarrow}(\sim\vee \mathrm{L})(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}2)$
$\frac{\overline{\neg(A\vee\sim A)\Rightarrow}}{\Rightarrow\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)}(\neg \mathrm{R})(\phi 2)$
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Using lemma 5.7 we can prove the main lemma, which is an embedding of LK into
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}^{||}$ . Again $\Gamma_{\sim_{\neg}}$ is obtained by substituting some $\neg$ ’s by $\sim \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}$ $\Gamma$ .
LEMMA 5.9 (MAIN LEMMA)
$\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}\vdash\Gamma_{\neg}\Rightarrow\Delta$ -if and only if $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\Gamma_{\sim}\neg’\sim\Delta_{\sim}\neg\Rightarrow$ . Moreover, it is also equivalent
to $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\Gamma_{\sim}\neg’\neg\Delta_{\sim}\neg\Rightarrow$ .
Proof. The second equivalence is obvious by $(\phi 2)$ and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\sim A\Rightarrow\neg A$.
We consider the first equivalence. The only if part of the lemma is shown semanti-
cally; Let $\mathfrak{U}$ an arbitrary $\mathrm{C}1$-model. By the soundness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\mathfrak{M}_{\mathfrak{U}}\models\Gamma_{\sim_{\neg}},$ $\sim\Delta\sim\neg\Rightarrow$ ,
and by lemma 5.5 we have $\mathfrak{U}\models\Gamma_{\neg},$ $\neg\Delta_{\neg}\Rightarrow$ , hence $21\models\Gamma_{\neg}\Rightarrow\Delta_{\neg}.$ Then by com-
pleteness of $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K},$ $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}\vdash\Gamma_{\neg}\Rightarrow\Delta_{\neg}$ .
We now consider the if part. First note that we may restrict axioms (or initial
sequents) of $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$ to the form $p(\vec{x})\Rightarrow p(\vec{x})$ . The proof is carried out through the
induction on the derivation in $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$ .
In the following $A_{\sim_{\neg}}$ is denoted by $A’$ to avoid the proof being too wide.
The inference rule of $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$ applied at last is presented in the left, and the correspond-





$\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\Sigma,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\Pi}$ (weakening) , ,$\frac{\Gamma’,\sim\Delta’\Rightarrow}{\Sigma,\Gamma,\sim\Delta’,\sim\Pi\Rightarrow},(\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g})$
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$. $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .
$\frac{A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{A\Lambda B,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ $\frac{A’,\Gamma’,\Delta’\Rightarrow}{A’\Lambda B,\Gamma’,\sim\Delta\Rightarrow},,(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$
For the rules introducing $\Lambda$ or $\forall$ , the proof is similar to that of $(\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ .
$\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,A}{\neg A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}(\neg \mathrm{L})$
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ . $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .
and
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$. $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .
$\frac{\Gamma’,\sim\Delta’,\sim A’\Rightarrow}{\neg A’,\Gamma’,\sim\Delta\Rightarrow},(\phi 2)$ $\sim A’,$ $\Gamma’,$ $\sim\Delta’\Rightarrow$
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ . $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .
$\frac{A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,\neg A}(\neg \mathrm{R})$ $\frac{\Gamma’,\sim\Delta’,A’\Rightarrow}{\Gamma’,\sim\Delta’,\sim\neg A’(\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim\sim A’)\Rightarrow}(\sim\neg \mathrm{L})$ or $(\sim\sim \mathrm{L})$
For the rule of LK $\frac{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,AB,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi}{Aarrow B,\Gamma,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Delta,\Pi}(arrow \mathrm{L}),$ we have in $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$
$\frac{A’arrow B’\Rightarrow\neg\neg(\sim A’\vee B’)(l3)\frac{\frac{\sim A’,\Gamma’,\sim\Delta’\Rightarrow B’,\Sigma\prime,\sim\Pi\prime.\Rightarrow \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}.\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}.\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}.\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}}{\sim A’\vee B’,\Gamma’,\Sigma\prime,\sim\Delta,\sim\Pi\Rightarrow}}{\overline{\neg\neg(\sim A’\vee\Sigma,\sim\Delta,\sim\Pi^{B’}\Rightarrow),\Gamma,\Sigma\prime,\sim\Delta’,\sim\Pi\prime\Rightarrow}}}{A’arrow B’,\Gamma’’’},$”” $(\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t})(\vee \mathrm{L})(\neg \mathrm{R}, \mathrm{L})$
$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$. $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{p}$ .
$\frac{A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,B}{\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,Aarrow B}(arrow \mathrm{R})$ $\frac{\Gamma’,\sim\Delta’,A’,\sim B’\Rightarrow}{\Gamma’,\sim\Delta’,\sim(Aarrow B’)\Rightarrow},(\simarrow \mathrm{L})$
$||_{\mathrm{I}\mathrm{n}}$ the literature [Tan80] an embedding of the $arrow$-free fragment of Cl into $\mathrm{N}$ is presented.
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COROLLARY5.10
Let $A_{\neg}$ be a formula of $\mathrm{C}1$ obtained by replacing $every\sim’ s$ by $\neg$ in a formula $A$ of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ .
Then for every sequent $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O},$ $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\forall\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ implies $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}\forall\Gamma_{\neg}\Rightarrow$ .
Proof. Take the emptyset as $\Delta_{\sim}\neg$ and use the lemma. $\mathrm{I}$
The next lemma certifies that we can construct a $\mathrm{C}1$-model which will be the seed
of an omniscient possible world.
LEMMA 5.11
Let $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ be an infiniie sequent of $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$ which is consistent, that is, for every finite
subsets $\Gamma’\subseteq\Gamma$ and $\Delta’\subseteq\Delta$ we have $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}\forall\Gamma’\Rightarrow\Delta’.$ Then there exists a Cl-model $\mathfrak{U}$
such that:
1. $|\mathfrak{U}|$ includes the set of all variables;
2. $\mathfrak{U}\models A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ for every $A\in\Gamma$ ;
3. $\mathfrak{U}\# B[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ for every $B\in\Delta$ .
Proof. First increase variables twofold, adding $x_{i}’$ for each original variable $x_{i}$ . Then an
infinite number of variables $x_{1}’,$ $x_{2}’,$ $\ldots$ have no occurrence in $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ which is a sequent
of the o.riginal formal language. Now with the $\mathrm{c}\underline{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ that $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta$ is consistent we
can extend it to a $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$-saturated infinite sequent $\Gamma\Rightarrow\tilde{\Delta},$ which induces a Cl-model 2$[$
where $|\mathfrak{U}|=\{x_{1},x_{1}’, x_{2}, x_{2}’, \ldots\}$ and the conditions 1. and 2. are satisfied. Hence $\mathfrak{U}$ is
what we would like to obtain. 1
REMARK 5.12
The reason why we cannot aPPly our method to the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}$ lies in the lemma
above. Given an infinite consistent sequent $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$ we must have infinitely many
extra variables to extend it to LK-saturation, which result in the extension of the
domain.
Now we prove the last lemma.
LEMMA 5.13
Let $A,$ $\mathfrak{M}’,$ $\mathfrak{M},$ $a’,$ $a$ and so on be the same as in the proof of theorem 5.6. Then $\mathfrak{M}’$
is $ce\hslash ainly$ an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$-model and $\mathfrak{M}’\# A$ .
Proof. First we show that $\mathfrak{M}’$ is an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1.$ As we saw in lemma 5.11, $U(a)\subseteq U(a’)$ .
If $\vec{x}\in p^{I^{+}(a)}$ $($or $p^{I^{-}(a)})_{-^{\mathrm{b}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}}}$, by the definition of $\mathfrak{M},$ $p(\vec{x})(\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim p(\vec{x}))$ is in $\Gamma$ where
$a$ : I $\mathrm{g}\Delta$ is anode of $\mathcal{T}.$ Now by the definition of $\mathfrak{U}$ which is a counter model for
the sequent $\Gamma_{\neg}\Rightarrow$ of $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K},$ $\mathfrak{U}\models p(\vec{\underline{x}})$ (or $\mathfrak{U}\models\neg p(\vec{\underline{x}})$ ), which in turn implies that
$a’\models^{+}p(\vec{\underline{x}})$ (or $a’\models^{-}p(\vec{\underline{x}})$ , respectively) by lemma 5.5. Hence we have obtained
$p^{I^{+}(a)}\subseteq p^{I^{+}(a’)}$ and $p^{I^{-}(a)}\subseteq p^{I^{-}(a’)}$ .
Since we added an omniscient world $a’$ for every $a\in M$ as a new daughter, $\mathfrak{M}’$ is
an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1$ .
Now it suffices to show $\mathfrak{M}’\# A,$ which is reduced to the following:
For every node $a:\Gamma\xi\Delta$ of $\overline{\mathcal{T}},$ $B\in\Gamma$ (or $B\in\Delta$) implies $a\models^{+}B[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$
(or $a\#^{+}B[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ , respectively) in $\mathfrak{M}’$ .
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Please note that in the above statement $a$ is considered as apossible world of $\mathfrak{M}’$ , not of
$\mathfrak{M}$ . This is verified as follows. If $B\in\Gamma$ , by the definition of $a’$ we have $a’\models^{+}B[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ ,
hence the addition of $a’$ does not affect the fact that $a\models^{+}B[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ .
Assume $B\in\Delta$ . It is an important fact here that the cases where $a\#^{+}B$ is
affected by the addition of anew daughter $a’$ are limited to those where the logical
connective $\neg,$ $arrow \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ $\forall$ is involved; i.e. where in order to verify whether $\models^{+}$ holds or not
we must see the descendants of $a$ . And on top of it, to show $a\#^{+}B[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ in such
cases what we must verify is “there is one world where $\ldots$ ”. Since $\mathfrak{M}$ was already the
model where $a\#^{+}B[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ , it also holds in $\mathfrak{M}’$ .
For example, assume $a\#^{+}\neg B$ in $\mathfrak{M}$ for aclosed formula $B$ . Then there is a
descendant $b$ of $a$ in $\mathfrak{M}$ where $b\models^{+}B$ , and $b$ is also in $\mathfrak{M}’$ . Hence we have $a\#^{+}\neg B$
in $\mathfrak{M}’$ , too. I
5.2 Another Proof-For $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ and $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}$
In this subsection we present another proof of Kripke completeness of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ . As we
saw above, we cannot apply the method in the previous subsection to $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO; that is
because we construct omniscient possible worlds after we have finished constructing a
counter $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model. In this way we cannot take affesh variable which is necessary to
make an omniscient world, without increasing variables.
The method presented here overcomes this kind of difficulty; it constructs both a
counter $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ -model and omniscient worlds simultaneously.
In the proofwe use atree-sequent with guardians, often abbreviated as $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ . Roughly
speaking, $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ is atree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ each of whose nodes has an extra sequent of
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ and afinite set of variables; each node has two sequents $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta.$ The
second sequent $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta$ is said to be aguardian sequent, or simply aguardian, of that
node.
Now we explain the idea of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ . To construct an omniscient world $a’$ for each
possible world $a$ of acounter $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-model after extending an unprovable tree-sequent of
$\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ , it is necessary to have arecord which formula must be verified or refuted at
$a’$ , and this information is written in the guardian sequent of $a$ . In other words, the
guardian sequent of $a$ is the seed of the omniscient world for $a$ .
We present the precise definition:
DEFINITION 5.14
Atree-sequent with guardians (TSg) $\mathcal{G}$ is afinite tree each of whose node $a$ is associated
with its own two sequents of $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ and two finite sets of variables, $\Gamma \mathrm{g}\Delta$ and $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta$
(we will denote this fact by ($a$ : [3 $\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\beta\Pi$ )), which satisfies the following
condition:
Let $\mathcal{G}^{t}$ be atree obtained by adding anew daughter $(a_{g} : \Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta\uparrow \Rightarrow )$ to
each node $(a:\Gamma\xi\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi)\beta$ , and then omitting all the guardians (Fig.
3). Then $\mathcal{G}^{t}$ is atree-sequent of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ ; that is, $\mathcal{G}^{t}$ satisfies the conditions as
to the availability of variables.
For example, $\alpha\cap\beta=\emptyset$ for $(a:\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi)\beta$.
$\mathrm{r}\Rightarrow\Delta$ is said to be aleft-sequent, or simply sequent of $a$ , and $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta$ aguardian










Fig. 3: $\mathcal{G}$ and $\mathcal{G}^{t}$
of $\mathcal{G}$ . Avariable $x$ is available at the node $a$ in $\mathcal{G}$ if it is available at $a$ in the translation
$\mathcal{G}^{t}\cdot x$ is available at $a_{g}$ in $\mathcal{G},$ where $a$ is a node of $\mathcal{G},$ if $x$ is available at the daughter
$a_{g}$ of $a$ in $\mathcal{G}^{t}$ .
Now we introduce the $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$-system $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ for the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ :
$\ldots$ [A $\xi A\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots$
(axiom 1)




$\overline{\ldots[\Gamma 3\Delta\uparrow A,\sim A3|\cdots}$
(axiom $\mathrm{g}2$)
(axiom gO)
. . . [I $\Rightarrow\Delta\uparrow\Rightarrow A\vee\sim A|\beta\ldots$
Inference rules
(weakening), (drop $\mathrm{L}$), $(\Lambda \mathrm{L}),$ $(\Lambda \mathrm{R}),$ $(arrow \mathrm{L}),$ $(arrow \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}},$ $(\neg \mathrm{L}),$ $(\neg \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}},$ $(\forall \mathrm{L}),$ $(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$ ,
$(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{L}),$ $(\sim\Lambda \mathrm{R}),$ $(\simarrow \mathrm{L}),$ $(\simarrow \mathrm{R}),$ $(\sim\neg \mathrm{L}),$ $(\sim\neg \mathrm{R}),$ $(\sim\sim \mathrm{L}),$ $(\sim\sim \mathrm{R}),$ $(\sim\forall \mathrm{L})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$
and $(\sim\forall \mathrm{R})$ ,
i.e. all the inference rules of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ except (cut), are adopted and applied to left-sequents,
not to guardians.
$. \cdot...\cdot\frac{[\Gamma\epsilon\Delta\uparrow A,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta}{[A,\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\alpha\beta}.\cdot...\cdot$ (enlightenment L)
The rules $(\mathrm{g}\cdots)$ involve only guardians but no left-sequents. For them we will indicate
only guardians.
. . . $\uparrow \mathrm{I}\Rightarrow\Delta|\beta\ldots$
(g-weakening)
. . . $\uparrow\Sigma,$ $\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta,$$\Pi|\beta\ldots$
$\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,A|\cdots\cdots\uparrow A,\Phi\Rightarrow\Psi|\beta\beta}{\beta}\ldots$ (g-cut)
. . . $\uparrow\Sigma,$ $\Phi\Rightarrow\Pi,$ $\Psi|\cdots$
$\underline{\ldots\uparrow A,B,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots}(\mathrm{g}\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ $\ldots\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,A|\beta}{\beta}$
.. . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$
$B|\beta\ldots(\mathrm{g}\Lambda \mathrm{R})$
$\ldots\uparrow A\Lambda B,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi\beta|\cdots$ . . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$ A $\Lambda B|\cdots$
$\ldots\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,A|\cdots\cdots\uparrow B,\Phi\Rightarrow\Psi|\beta\beta}{\uparrow Aarrow B,\Sigma,\Phi\Rightarrow\Pi,\Psi|\beta}\ldots\cdots(\mathrm{g}arrow \mathrm{L})$
.
$. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{\uparrow A,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,B|\beta}{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,Aarrow B|\beta}...\cdot\cdot\cdot(\mathrm{g}arrow \mathrm{R})$
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$. \cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,A|\beta}{\uparrow\neg A,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta}..\cdot\cdot\cdot\cdot(\mathrm{g}\neg \mathrm{L})$
$\underline{\ldots\uparrow A,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots}(\mathrm{g}\neg \mathrm{R})$
. . . 1 $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$$\neg A|\beta\ldots$
$\ldots\frac{\uparrow A[y/x],\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta}{\beta}\ldots(\mathrm{g}\forall \mathrm{L})$ $\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\xi^{z\}}\beta\cup\square ,A[z/x]|}{\beta}\ldots(\mathrm{g}\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$
. . . $\uparrow\forall xA,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\cdots$ . . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,\forall xA|\cdots$
$\ldots\ldots\frac{\uparrow\sim A,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\cdots\cdots\uparrow\sim B,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\beta}{\uparrow\sim(A\Lambda B),\Sigma\Rightarrow\square |\beta}\ldots\cdots(\mathrm{g}\sim\Lambda \mathrm{L})\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,\sim A,\sim B|\beta}{\beta}\ldots(\mathrm{g}\sim\Lambda \mathrm{R})$
. . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$ $\sim(A\wedge B)|\cdots$
. . . $\uparrow A,$ $\sim B,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots$
$( \mathrm{g}\simarrow \mathrm{L})\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,A|\beta}{\beta}\ldots$
.. . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$$\sim B|\beta\ldots(\mathrm{g}\simarrow \mathrm{R})$
. . . $\uparrow\sim(Aarrow B),$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots$ . . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$ $\sim(Aarrow B)|\cdots$
$\underline{\ldots\uparrow A,\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots}(\mathrm{g}\sim\neg \mathrm{L})$
. . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$$A|\beta\ldots$
$(\mathrm{g}\sim\neg \mathrm{R})$
.. . $\uparrow\sim\neg A,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots$ . . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$$\sim\neg A|\beta\ldots$
. . . $\uparrow A,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots$ . . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$$A|\beta\ldots$
$(\mathrm{g}\sim\sim \mathrm{L})$ $(\mathrm{g}\sim\sim \mathrm{R})$
. $..\uparrow\sim\sim A,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\square |\beta\ldots$ . . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,$$\sim sim A|\beta\ldots$
$\underline{\ldots\uparrow\sim A[z/x],\Sigma\beta\cup\xi^{z\}}\Pi|\cdots}(\mathrm{g}\sim\forall \mathrm{L})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}$
$\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi,\sim A[y/x]|\beta}{\beta}\ldots(\mathrm{g}\sim\forall \mathrm{R})$
. . . $\uparrow\sim\forall xA,$ $\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\ldots$ . . . $\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\square ,$ $\sim\forall xA|\cdots$
In view of the function of aguardian as aseed of an omniscient possible world, the
logical rules as to guardians are to be of the form of those in $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{K}$ , as above.
Now we define the translation irvto a formula of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ (;, in an inductive way similar
to that of tree-sequent. A $pre- \mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ satisfies every condition of $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ except the one that
if $x$ is free in the sequent of $a$ (or in the guardian of $a$), then $x$ is available at $a$ (or
at $a_{g},$ respectively). A translation into a formula of a $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}-\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ (;, denoted by $\mathcal{G}^{f}$ , is
defined inductively on the height of $\mathcal{G}$ :
$\backslash [\Gamma\xi\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\mathcal{G}_{1}\ldots \mathcal{G}_{m}]^{f}\beta$
$:\equiv\forall\partial((\Lambda^{\Gamma})arrow(\vee\Delta)\vee\forall\vec{\beta}\neg\neg((\wedge\Sigma)arrow(\vee\Pi))\vee \mathcal{G}_{1}^{f}\vee\cdots\vee \mathcal{G}_{m}^{f})$
As is the case for systems of tree-sequent, we can prove the following lemma, which
may be regarded as the soundness of $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ :
LEMMA 5.15
If $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash(;$ , then $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash Cif$ .
Proof. Since the counterparts of lemma 2.11 and 2.12 are easily verified, we can
assume that the node to which an inference rule is applied (or the node which is in the
form indicated in an axiom) is nothing but the root. Now we prove the lemma by the
induction on the derivation of $\mathcal{G}$ in $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ .
The cases for (axiom 1), (2), (g1) or (g2) are easy.
For the (axiom gO), by omniscience axiom $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\neg\neg(A\vee\sim A)$ .
For the rules which are common in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ and $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ such as (drop L) or $(\sim\forall \mathrm{R})$ ,
the proof is carried out just as we did in the proof of lemma 2.10.
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For remaining rules involving guardians, some proofs are obvious, others are com-
plicated. Here we present the latter cases.
Before considering each cases, we prepare the following fact:
$\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ ( $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{J}$ or $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ ) $\vdash\neg\neg(A\vee\neg A)$ (S)
$\frac{A\Rightarrow A}{\underline A\Rightarrow A\vee\neg A}(\vee \mathrm{R})(\neg \mathrm{L})$
$\underline{A,\neg(A\vee\neg A)\Rightarrow}(\neg \mathrm{R})$
$\underline{\neg(A\vee\neg A)\Rightarrow\neg A}(\vee \mathrm{R})$
$\neg(A\vee\neg A)\Rightarrow A\vee\neg A$
$\overline{\neg(A\vee\neg A),\neg(A\vee\neg A)\Rightarrow}(\neg \mathrm{L})$
$\overline{\Rightarrow\neg\neg(A\vee\neg A)}(\neg \mathrm{R})$
For $(\mathrm{g}\neg \mathrm{R})$ , it suffices to show that $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\neg\neg(C\Lambda Aarrow D)\Rightarrow\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee\neg A)$.
$C,$ $A,$
$C\Lambda Aarrow..\cdot$.
$D\Rightarrow D\vee\neg A$ $C,$ $\neg A,$
$C\Lambda Aarrow.\cdot.\cdot D\Rightarrow D\vee\neg A$
$\frac{\Rightarrow\neg\neg(A\vee\neg A)\overline{\neg\neg(A\vee\neg A),\neg\neg(C\Lambda Aarrow D)\Rightarrow\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee\neg A)}(l)\frac{\overline C,A\vee\neg A,C\Lambda Aarrow D\Rightarrow D\vee\neg A}{\overline A\vee\neg A,C\Lambda Aarrow D\Rightarrow Carrow D\vee\neg A}(arrow \mathrm{R})}{\neg\neg(C\Lambda Aarrow D)\Rightarrow\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee\neg A)}(\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t})(\neg \mathrm{L},\mathrm{R})(\vee \mathrm{L})$
For $(\mathrm{g}arrow \mathrm{R})$ , the proof is similar to above, using $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\neg\neg(A\vee\neg A)$ .
For $(\mathrm{g}\forall \mathrm{R})$ , it suffices to show that $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash\forall z\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee A[z/x])\Rightarrow\neg\neg(Carrow$
$D\vee\forall xA)$ , where $z$ is not free in $C$ nor $D$ .
$\overline{D,\sim D\Rightarrow}$
(axiom 2) $\overline{A[z/x],\sim A[z/x]\Rightarrow}(\mathrm{a}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}2)$
$C\Rightarrow C$
$\overline{D\vee A[z/x],\sim D,\sim A[z/x]\Rightarrow}(\vee \mathrm{L})$
$\overline{\forall z\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee A[z/x]),C,\sim D,\sim A[z/x]\Rightarrow\underline{\underline{Carrow D\vee A[z/x],C,\sim D,\sim A[z/x]\Rightarrow}}}(\neg \mathrm{R},\neg \mathrm{L},\forall \mathrm{L})(arrow \mathrm{L})$
$\overline{\overline{\forall z\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee A[z/x]),\sim(Carrow D\vee\forall xA)\Rightarrow}}\overline{\forall z\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee A[z/x]),C,\sim D,\sim\forall xA\Rightarrow}(\sim\forall \mathrm{L})_{\mathrm{V}\mathrm{C}}(\sim\vee \mathrm{L},\simarrow \mathrm{L})$
$\overline{\forall z\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee A[z/x]),\neg(Carrow D\vee\forall xA)\Rightarrow}(l2)$
$\overline{\forall z\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee A[z/x])\Rightarrow\neg\neg(Carrow D\vee\forall xA)}(\neg \mathrm{R})$
1
We are to extend an unprovable $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ into saturation and derive a counter model
from it; hence the definition of saturatedness is as follows:
DEFINITION 5.16 $(\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}- \mathrm{S}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{A}\mathrm{T}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{S}\mathrm{S})$
An infinite $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathcal{G}$ is $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ -saturated if it satisfies the following conditions:
1. The translation into a tree-sequent, $\mathcal{G}^{t},$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ ;
2. For every node $(a:\Gamma\xi\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi)\beta$ and every atomic formula $p(\vec{x}),$ if $\vec{x}$ is
available at $a_{g}$ then $p(\vec{x})\in\Sigma \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim p(\vec{x})\in\Sigma$ .
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Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ such that T$\mathrm{g}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\forall$ (; and at least one variable is available at its root.
$\mathrm{e}$ will extend $\mathcal{G}$ step by step to obtain asequence of unprovable $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{s}\mathcal{G}\mathrm{o}(\equiv \mathcal{G}),$ $\mathcal{G}_{1},$ $\ldots$ ,
$\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}$ as we did in $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ . The step from $\mathcal{G}_{i-1}$ to $\mathcal{G}_{i}$ involves $A_{i}(A_{1},$ $A_{2},$ $\ldots$ is the same
quence of formula as subsection 2.4), and is stated in detail as follows:
1. APPly the same operations (inheritance and reduction) to the left-sequents of $\mathcal{G}$ .
For example, if ( $a$ :I $\Rightarrow\Delta\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi$ )
$\beta$
and $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ , then add $A_{i}$ to the antecedent
of the left-sequent of each decsendant of $a$ , not involving guardians;
2. (report) For each node $(a : \Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta\alpha\uparrow \mathrm{I}\Rightarrow\square )\beta$ , if $A_{i}\in\Gamma$ then add $A_{i}$ to X. This
operation is called areport and unprovability is preserved because of the rule
(enlightenment $\mathrm{L}$);
3. ( $\mathrm{g}$-reduction)According to the shape of $A_{i}$ , one of the following operations is
executed for each node $(a:\Gamma\Rightarrow\Delta\uparrow \mathrm{I}\Rightarrow\Pi):\beta$
(a) $A_{i}\equiv p(\vec{x})$ . If $\vec{x}$ is available at $a_{g}$ , then add $p(\vec{x})$ or $\sim p(\vec{x})$ to $\Sigma$ , so
that unprovability is preserved. This is possible; if not, we can derive a
contradiction as follows:
(axiom gO)
$\ldots\ldots\frac{\uparrow\Rightarrow p(\vec{x})\vee\sim p(\vec{x})1\beta\frac{\uparrow p(\vec{x}),\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\cdots\cdots\uparrow\sim p(\vec{x}),\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\beta}{\uparrow\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta\uparrow p(\vec{x})\vee\sim p(\vec{x}),\Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi|\beta(\mathrm{g}- \mathrm{c}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t})}}{}\ldots\cdots\ldots\ldots\cdots.\cdots(\mathrm{g}\vee \mathrm{L})$
(b) $A_{i}\equiv B\Lambda C$ . If $A_{i}\in\Sigma$ , then add both $B$ and $C$ to I. Unprovability is
preserved by the rule $(\mathrm{g}\Lambda \mathrm{L})$ . If $A_{i}\in\Pi$ , then add $B$ or $C$ to $\Pi,$ so that
unprovability is preserved. This is possible by $(\mathrm{g}\Lambda \mathrm{R})$ ;
(c) $A_{i}\equiv Barrow C$ . If $A_{i}\in\Sigma$ , then add $B$ to $\Pi$ or $C$ to $\Sigma$ , so that unprovability
is preserved. If $A_{i}\in\Pi$ , then add $B$ to I and $C$ to $\Pi$ ;
(d) $A_{i}\equiv\neg B$ . If $A_{i}\in \mathrm{I}$ (or $\Pi$), then add $B$ to $\Pi$ (or $\Sigma$ , respectively) ;
(e) $A_{i}\equiv\forall xB$ . If $A_{i}\in\Sigma$ , then add $B[y/x]$ to $\Sigma$ , for every $y$ which is available
at $a_{g}$ and is in $\{x_{1}, \ldots, x_{i}\}$ . If $A_{i}\in\Pi$ , then take afresh variable $x_{m}$ , add
$A[x_{m}/x]$ to $\Pi$ and also add $x_{m}$ to $\beta$ ;
(f) $A_{i}\equiv\sim(B\Lambda C)$ . If $A_{i}\in\Sigma,$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\sim B\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim C$ to $\Sigma$ , so that unprovability is
preserved. If $A_{i}\in\square ,$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\sim B\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\sim C$ to $\Pi$ ;
(g) $A_{i}\equiv\sim(Barrow C)$ . If $A_{i}\in\Sigma$ , add $B\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\sim C$ to I. If $A_{i}\in\Pi$ , add $B\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\sim C$
to $\Pi$ so that unprovability is preserved;
(h) $A_{i}\equiv\sim\neg B$ or $A_{i}\equiv\sim\sim B$ . If $A_{i}\in\Sigma$ (or $\square$), add $B$ to I(or $\Pi$ , respectively) ;
(i) $A_{i}\equiv\sim\forall xB$ . If $A_{i}\in\Sigma$ , then take afresh variable $x_{m},$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{d}\sim B[x_{m}/x]$ to $\Sigma$ ,
and also add $x_{m}$ to $\beta$ . If $A_{i}\in\Pi$ , add $\sim B[y/x]$ to $\Pi$ for every $y$ which is
available at $a_{g}$ and in $\{x_{1}, \ldots, x_{i}\}$ .
Let $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}$ be the infinite $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ which is the union of $\mathcal{G}0,$ $\mathcal{G}_{1},$ $\ldots$ . Then $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}$ is $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}-$
Gurated. Indeed, it satisfies the condition that $\overline{\mathcal{G}}^{t}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$-saturated;for example, a
de $(a_{g} : \Sigma\Rightarrow\Pi)\beta$ of $\tilde{\mathcal{G}}^{t}$ satisfies the condition
$(\forall \mathrm{R})_{\mathrm{t}}$ -saturated:If $\forall xA\in\Sigma$ , then there exists adescendant $b:\Phi\Rightarrow\beta\Psi$ of
$a_{g}$ and avariable $y$ such that $A[y/x]\in\Psi$
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by taking $a_{g}$ itself as $b.\overline{\mathcal{G}}$ satisfies the second condition of $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ -saturatedness by
the operation ( $\mathrm{g}$-reduction)as to atomic formulas.
Since an infinite tree-sequent $\overline{\mathcal{G}}^{t}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d},$ it induces an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1\mathfrak{M}$ in the
way stated in subsection 2.4. Moreover, the second condition of $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ -saturatedness
yields that $\mathfrak{M}$ is actually an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1,$ where the omniscient world $a’$ for each world
$a$ induced by $a_{g}$ of $\overline{\mathcal{G}}^{t}$ .
The following is $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\underline{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{y}$ verified by the induction on the construction of aformula
$A$ using the fact that $\mathcal{G}^{t}$ is $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}- \mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}:$ for every node $a$ : $\Gamma \mathrm{g}\Delta$ of $\mathcal{G}^{t}(\mathcal{G}$ is
an original $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ which is unprovable), $a\in\Gamma$ (or $a\in\Delta$ ) implies $a\models^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ (or
$a\#^{+}A[\vec{\underline{x}}/\vec{x}]$ , respectively). Hence we have proved the following theorem:
THEOREM 5. 17 (KRIPKE COMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ )
Let $\mathcal{G}$ be a $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$ of $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ at whose root at least one varriable is available, and $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\forall$
$\mathcal{G}.$ Then there exists a counter $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}- model\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ for $\mathcal{G}$ ;that is, $\mathfrak{M}$ is
a counter model for the tree-sequent $\mathcal{G}^{t}$ in the sense stated in theorem 2.14.
COROLLARY 5.18 (KRIPKE cOMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ )
For every formula $A$ of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O},$ $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\models A$ implies $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\vdash A$ .
Proof. Let a $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathcal{G}$ be $[\Rightarrow\alpha A\uparrow\Rightarrow\emptyset]$ where $\alpha\neq\emptyset$ . By the contraposition of
lemma 5.15 we have $\mathrm{T}_{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}\forall \mathcal{G},$ hence the theorem yields that there exists a counter
$\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$-model $\mathfrak{M}$ for $\mathcal{G}$ , which makes $A$ not valid. I
Now we consider the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$DO. The Gentzen-style sequent system $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO for
the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}$ is $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ plus constant domain axiom
$\overline{\Rightarrow\forall x(A(x)\vee B)arrow\forall xA(x)\vee B}$
(axiom D)
. An $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}- \mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}1\mathfrak{M}=(M, \leq, U, I^{+}, I^{-})$ is an $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO-model if $U$ is aconstant map.
After making the same kind of alterations as we did from $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ to $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}$ , the $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{S}_{\mathrm{g}}$
method for $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{O}$ stated above can be also applied to the logic $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO, and we obtain
the following theorem:
THEOREM 5. 19 (MAIN THEOREM 2, KRIPKE COMPLETENESS OF $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO)
For every formula $A$ of $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO, $\mathrm{N}_{\neg}\mathrm{D}\mathrm{O}\models A$ if and only if $\mathrm{G}\mathrm{N}_{\neg}$ DO $\vdash A$ .
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